All About Estates
By Jessica J. Butler
March 13th, 2026
A recent British Columbia decision has revisited a deceptively simple question in estate law: what does it mean to be a “child” of a deceased person?
The case involved a claim brought by a woman against the estate of the deceased under section 60 of British Columbia’s Wills, Estates and Succession Act (“WESA”). Section 60 of WESA permits a spouse or “child” of a deceased to ask the court to vary the deceased’s will if it fails to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of the spouse or child.
During his lifetime, the deceased made a will leaving his entire estate to his brother and separately swore a statutory declaration disavowing the plaintiff and declaring that she was not his child. All parties agreed that the deceased was not the woman’s biological father and he had not adopted her. However, the plaintiff argued that the deceased held himself out as her father throughout her life, introducing her publicly as his child, actively parenting her, and he was even listed as her father on her birth certificate. The plaintiff argued that she should therefore be considered the deceased’s “child” for wills variation purposes. The challenge for the plaintiff is that for purposes of wills variation claims, WESA does not define who qualifies as a “child” and instead relies on the common law definition developed by the courts.
The defendants sought to have the claim dismissed at an early stage, arguing that British Columbia law is settled and only biological or adopted children may bring wills variation claims under WESA. However, the court declined to strike the claim. The court found that the plaintiff’s claim was not bound to fail and allowed the claim to continue. The court noted that, although the British Columbia Court of Appeal had previously ruled that “child” means biological or adopted children only in wills variation claims, the decisions expressly left the door open to reconsider the definition if the particular facts of a future case or societal changes warranted it. To be clear, the judge did not decide in this decision whether the plaintiff was, in fact, a “child” for wills variation purposes, but only whether the claim was so legally untenable that it could not proceed.
I am based in Ontario and so it was interesting for me to consider how Ontario and BC approach this issue.
In Ontario, Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”) allows certain people to make a claim for support from an estate if the deceased has not made adequate provision for them. In the case of a “child”, the definition is broader than in BC. This contrast is what makes the BC case particularly interesting for Ontario readers.
The outcome for the plaintiff may ultimately be the same in both provinces, but for different reasons. It may be that in both provinces the courts would agree that the deceased did not make adequate provision for the plaintiff. However, in BC the plaintiff may not qualify to make the wills variation claim at all because of the (currently) narrower definition of “child”. Although Ontario has a broader definition of “child” in this context, if the plaintiff was not receiving financial support from the deceased when he died, she would not qualify as a dependant because a parent does not generally have a legal obligation to support an adult child, in which case her claim would not be successful.
It will be interesting to see if the BC case proceeds to trial and, if it does, whether the court determines that the facts of the case warrant a reconsideration of the Court of Appeal decisions, and an expansion of the definition of “child” for wills variation purposes to include the “settled intention” scenario.
For Ontario families, the practical message is unchanged but worth emphasizing. If you intend for someone to benefit from your estate, particularly where family relationships do not align neatly with legal categories, that intention must be expressed clearly.
